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Abstract: This paper will argue that secular Tunisian women have faced a unique set of challenges to 
accessing formal political power since 2011, indicating a disconnect between the dominant image of Tunisia 
and the reality of the post-revolutionary state and society. It will examine secular women’s invisibility in 
formal politics, in sharp contrast to their visibility both historically and during the uprisings, by 
deconstructing the nuanced ways in which access to full citizenship rights is differentiated by gender and 
other identity markers. In doing so, this paper will situate Tunisian secular women in the contemporary 
political scene, revealing the ways in which power has reconsolidated in the vanguard state of the Arab 
Spring.
*
 
 
 
Tunisian women were a powerful presence during the uprisings of 2010 and 2011, setting a 
precedent for the rest of the region during the Arab Spring. With no gender segregation amongst 
the protesters, women marched side by side with men, chanting and singing pro-democracy 
slogans. Images of women wrapped in Tunisian flags, shouting in the faces of security forces, and 
occupying the streets streamed out of Tunisia, capturing the eyes of the international community. 
Lina Ben Mhenni, a young Tunisian woman who wrote the blog “A Tunisian Girl”, even garnered a 
Nobel Peace Prize nomination for her fearless coverage of the protests throughout the country.1  
 
The images of women, many of whom were seemingly secular, participating in the uprisings 
alongside their male counterparts fit the expectations set by the regimes of Ben Ali and Bourguiba 
of women as viable and autonomous political actors in Tunisia given their historically high status in 
comparison to the rest of the region. Tunisia, existing in relative global obscurity before 2011, was 
known essentially for its commitment to a secular political system and society, along with its long 
history of support for women’s rights. Tunisia’s relaxed attitude towards dress and alcohol, along 
with the visible role of secular women in society, due in large part to the 1956 promulgation of the 
most secular Code of Personal Status, (known by its French acronym, CSP), that the Arab world 
had ever seen, helped solidify the perception that Tunisia was a bastion of secularism and the 
standard bearer for women’s rights in the region. The reality, however, was the continual 
utilization of women’s rights as a mechanism of state power and consolidation, under the guise of 
modernism.2 Nonetheless, the political, social, and economic nature of the protests and the 
interim government’s passage of a gender parity law before the elections only served to 
underscore the prevailing and popular image of a progressive Tunisia.  
 
This image had been reinforced by the almost exclusive focus on secular women and their position 
vis-à-vis the state in the existing literature on women in Tunisia, especially in relation to Islamist 
women, who are essentially invisible. This emphasis portrayed them as the only female actors 
within the incredibly narrow political space afforded Tunisians in an authoritarian state, and thus 
the women most advantageously positioned to access political power following Ben Ali’s fall. 
However, defying expectations set and reinforced by secular women’s roles in history and the 
uprisings, they were largely invisible in the subsequent interim governments and were similarly 
underrepresented in the constitutional body elected in the 2011 elections, particularly vis-à-vis 
Islamist women. This paper seeks to explore this disconnect as it relates to secular women in 
contemporary Tunisian politics, filling a necessary gap to enhance understanding of the political 
dynamics of the new Tunisian state. 
 
                                                  
*
 This work was presented by Zoe Petkanas at the CGHR Research Group in November 2012.  The author would like to 
thank the discussant, Dr Maha Abdel-Rahman for her helpful comments and feedback, my supervisor Professor George 
Joffe for all of his support, and all of the people I interviewed in Tunis for their generosity. 
1
 Y. Ryan ‘Tunisian blogger becomes Nobel Prize nominee’, Al Jazeera, 21 October 2011. 
2
 See Charrad, Brand, Chekir, Grami, Anderson, Arfaoui, and Labidi. 
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1. Tunisian Women in the Literature 
  
Given the activist nature of the state under Bourguiba and Ben Ali, the primary discursive frame 
through which scholars analyze the development of women’s rights is a legal one, essentially 
focusing on the changing relationship between the state and Tunisian women. Throughout these 
texts, the nature of that relationship is in opposition to Islamism, whereas progress is conflated 
with the secularization of the legal system, either implicitly or explicitly, as the arguments are 
located outside of religion. 
 
Mounira Charrad, a prolific Tunisian legal scholar, employs several lenses through which to analyze 
the relationship between women and the state, one of which is defined by discussion of the 
state’s legal relationship to women within the context of gendered citizenship. Studies in gendered 
citizenship are concerned with the ways in which women are incorporated into modern politics 
and the state by virtue of gender.3 In much of her work, Charrad deconstructs the supposedly 
gender-neutral view of liberal citizenship by articulating how multiple layers of identity 
differentiate access to rights within the nation-state.4 Charrad situates her analysis in the process 
of state formation, emphasizing how the “relationship between the national state and kin-based 
tribal groups as it evolved historically chapters the structure of the state and its policies”, in this 
instance, its policies on women’s rights.5 A comparativist, Charrad uses a transnational analysis of 
the Maghreb countries to illustrate the degrees to which state formation impacts the 
development of women’s rights in the context of constituting a citizen.6 
 
Hafidha Chekir and Amel Grami employ a different approach. They situate their discussions of the 
legal relationship between the state and women in a framework of ‘equality’, rather than 
citizenship. Grami, for example, uses changes in family law as a barometer, as they are 
“considered as a significant indicator of social change in the Middle East”.7 Chekir, by contrast, 
uses family law as a stepping-stone into a conversation about replacing the patriarchal system 
with an egalitarian one.8 Unlike Charrad, who often draws her discussions into the theoretical, 
both Chekir and Grami analyze the impact of Tunisia’s laws on women to explore the practical 
implications of the legal status of women in Tunisia as compared to men. To that end, they both 
pair discussions of progress with diagnoses of remaining inequalities, citing the distance between 
the three points of law, implementation or enforcement, and practice.   
 
In contrast, Laurie Brand’s discussion of the law is incidental to her larger point, which is the 
overall relationship of the state to women in Tunisia, in which there is a legal component. She 
does include a section where she outlines the legal status of women, describing both gains and 
remaining inequalities. Instead of emphasizing the law, however, Brand situates a discussion of 
the legal relationship of women to the state within a larger conversation on state manipulation 
and utilization of women and women’s rights within Tunisia. She focuses on the corporatist 
relationship of the state to women in Tunisia, including an extensive discussion of the ways in 
which Tunisia’s two presidents, Bourguiba and Ben Ali, had co-opted the supposedly non-state civil 
society actors for their own political ends. In contrast to Charrad, Grami, and Chekir, Brand focuses 
                                                  
3
 D. Kandiyoti, ‘Foreword’ in S. Joseph (ed.) Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, Syracuse University Press, 
Syracuse, 2000,p.xiii. 
4
 See Charrad (1998, 2000, 2001, and 2007). 
5
 M. Charrad, ‘State and Gender in the Maghrib’ in S. Joseph and S. Slymovics (eds.) Women and power in the Middle 
East, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2001,p.61. 
6
 See Charrad 2000, 2001, 2001a. 
7
 A. Grami, ‘Gender Equality in Tunisia’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 35(3), December 2008, p.360. 
8
 H. Chekir, ‘Women, the Law, and the Family in Tunisia’, Gender and Development, vol. 4(2), Jun. 1996, pp.43-46. 
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more on the ways that the state’s relationship to women fit into the broader political narrative of 
Tunisian modern political history.9 Like Charrad, Brand is also a comparativist and she embeds her 
discussion of Tunisia in a broader context by including Jordan and Morocco. 
 
Brand is accompanied in this approach by Lisa Anderson and, sometimes, by Charrad, who has 
already been mentioned above. Another comparativist, Anderson also emphasizes the larger 
machinations of the Tunisian state as it relates to women and women’s rights. In her book, The 
State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya 1830-1980, she delves farther into history 
than any of her counterparts, comparing the ways in which the Tunisian and Libyan states utilized 
their institutional resources to engineer social change and facilitate state consolidation. As her 
frame, Anderson employs the divergent paths of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial state 
formation to highlight parallels and differences between the two states. Anderson primarily draws 
on the highly centralized bureaucratization of the Tunisian state from the late-19th century 
onwards as the primary factor driving state policy post-independence, including the Tunisian 
state’s relationship to women.10 Like Brand, she situates these issues within a larger political 
discourse. 
 
Similar to Brand and Anderson, Charrad, when employing this modality, uses a more focused 
gendered approach to make a broader political point about the Tunisian state. In her work, ‘Policy 
Shifts: State, Islam, and Gender in Tunisia 1930s-1990s’, she emphasizes the ways that larger 
political goals of the Tunisian state were articulated through its fluid and flexible policies directed 
towards women. For example, she traces Bourguiba’s retreats and advances on women’s rights 
back to his changing relationship with Islamists and leftists, tying his policies on women to his 
various political needs at the time. Focused and incisive, Charrad charts the evolving relationship 
of women to the state over the broader political context, belying any feminist intent on the part of 
the Tunisian state.11 
 
There also exists a body of literature on women in Tunisia in which non-state actors are the 
primary focus.  Despite the attempts by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali to monopolize the women’s 
movement, an autonomous feminist discourse began to develop outside the state for the first 
time in the late-1970s. Discussion of this phenomenon can be broken into two parts: the 
development of the discourse and the translation of the discourse into political platforms. The two 
are not always discussed in tandem.  
 
Ilhem Marzouki, Khadija Arfaoui, Lilia Labidi, Sarah Gilman, and Laurie Brand all produce 
essentially the same narrative about the development of the autonomous women’s movement in 
Tunisia.12 Starting with the Club d’Études de la Condition des Femmes (CECF), the authors detail the 
beginnings of a discourse on women’s rights and feminism in Tunisia outside of the state. Labidi is 
the only of these authors to describe and analyze the new discourse rather than just 
acknowledging its existence. She articulates the process through which Tunisian feminists engaged 
in anthropological methods to explore the socio-specification of an internationalist discourse on 
human rights to create a new Tunisian feminism.13 
 
                                                  
9
 L. Brand, Women, the State, and Political Liberalization: Middle East and North African Experiences, Columbia 
University Press, New York City, 1998. 
10
 L. Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1986.  
11
 M. Charrad, ‘Policy Shifts: State, Islam, and Gender in Tunisia, 1930s-1990s’, Social Politics, Summer, 1997, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, pp.284-319. 
12
 See Marzouki, Arfaoui, Labidi, Gilman, and Brand. 
13
 L. Labidi, The Nature of Transnational Alliances in Women’s Associations in the Maghreb: The Case of AFTURD and 
ATFD’, Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, vol. 3(1), winter 2007, pp.6-34. 
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The next phase of this narrative is the institutionalization of the discourse. Each of the authors cite 
the founding of Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD) and Association des 
Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le Développement (AFTURD), both of which were 
legalized during the relative openness of Ben Ali’s first few years as president. Each author goes on 
to create a narrative dichotomy of the women’s movement between the state, whose interests 
are articulated directly through the L’Union Nationale de la Femme Tunisienne (UNFT) and the 
non-state actor, represented by ATFD.14 In other words, ATFD, and by extension secular feminism 
rooted in internationalism, dominates the narrative on the autonomous women’s movement in 
Tunisia.  
 
The unity of the narrative is interesting and raises some questions. It focuses exclusively on a 
secular, humanist, and internationalist discourse of feminism enshrined in organizations that acted 
as a kind of counterweight to the government. This dichotomy, which may well have been 
reflective of the public conversation, renders impossible the existence of any other feminisms. The 
prominence of female Nahdawi deputies in the post-revolutionary political scene prompts 
questions concerning the development of Islamic feminism in Tunisia, for which the dominant 
framework does not allow. This emphasis on secular feminism in Tunisia, and particularly on the 
institutionalization of that feminism in the form of ATFD, produces a simplified image.  
 
These texts are united in their positioning of, mostly secular, women in contention with the state, 
by emphasizing either the continuing misogyny of the Tunisian government in a legal framework 
or the oppositional politics of the autonomous, and secular, women’s movement. This lens 
positions secular women largely in opposition to a dictatorial state, setting them up as potentially 
viable political actors, should the confines of a repressive regime fall away. The dominant narrative 
on feminism in Tunisia and the primary discursive frames of the existing literature helped to build 
the expectation that secular women in Tunisia, of all places, would be uniquely and 
advantageously positioned to access political power in the new state given a history of relatively 
open organizing. 
  
 
2. The Democracy Paradox 
 
The expectations resulting from the historic visibility of secular Tunisian women, the focus of the 
existing literature, and the presence of secular women during the uprisings contrasted sharply 
with their exclusion from the interim governments formed in the wake of Ben Ali’s exit. Only two 
of nineteen, and then two of twenty-three, members of the initial interim governments were 
women, in contrast to the relatively high numbers of women in the government of Ben Ali. 
Similarly, the Independent Electoral Commission (ISIE), tasked with organizing the election in 
October, had only two women out of twelve members.15 Valerie Moghadam, an expert in social 
change and movements in the Arab world, explained this phenomenon as part of the “democracy 
paradox” or “the gender-based democracy deficit”, in which women are marginalized from the 
political process in a democratic polity in a post-protest space.16  
 
Despite this exclusion, however, there were some seemingly positive developments for women. In 
April 2011, the High Commission for the Realization of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reforms and 
                                                  
14
 ATFD is classified as non-state insofar as it is not affiliated with the state party, but the term “non-state” is used while 
recognizing that within a political system in which civil society is highly regulated and managed by the state, “non-state” 
remains a diluted concept.  
15
 K. Goulding, ‘Tunisia: Arab Spring, Islamist Summer’, openDemocracy, 25 October 2011, p. 2. 
16
 V. Moghadam, ‘Engendering Democracy: Women and the Mass Social Protests in the Middle East and North Africa’, 
Nonviolent Initiative for Democracy, 24 March 2011. 
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Democratic Transition, a coalition of 150 politicians and civil society actors tasked with examining 
new laws and ensuring that they were in keeping with the demands of the revolution, passed a 
gender parity law for the elections in October.17 Electoral law determined that the election 
followed a closed list proportional system. This meant that parties submitted lists of ranked 
candidates prior to the election. The proportion of votes that a list received in a district 
determined how many candidates from the list would sit at the Assembly.18 The gender parity law 
required candidate lists to be evenly split between men and women and for them to be listed in a 
“zippered” fashion, alternating between genders.19  
 
In addition to the gender parity law, prominent female appointee Lilia Labidi, the interim Minister 
of Women’s Affairs, was dispatched across the globe to bring attention to the situation of 
women’s rights in Tunisia. The government launched a huge radio and TV campaign to encourage 
Tunisian women to vote called “I Must Go There”.20 And in September, Tunisia removed its 
reservations on the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), about which many had complained prevented implementation of the international 
convention.21 
 
As the country readied for elections in October, political parties began forming, benefitting from a 
newly opened arena and wildly diversifying the formerly controlled political sphere in which only 
nine political parties operated. By October, over 100 official parties had formed, of which only six 
had been legal under Ben Ali and with six that identified as Islamist.22 Most major parties were 
secular, with the exception of Ennahda, who re-emerged for the first time since Ben Ali’s fierce 
crackdown in the 1990s.23 Ennahda was the most organized and best financed of all the parties, 
capitalizing on its name recognition and ability to connect on a grassroots level outside the capital, 
which proved a perennial problem for secular parties. By October, Ennahda’s impending success 
was almost a foregone conclusion.  
 
Internationally hailed as free and fair, the Tunisian elections were described by a US Embassy 
official as “outstanding”.24 While only 55% of the total voting population registered to vote, and 
only 45% of those registered were women, 90% of registered voters turned up at the polls. The 
extraordinarily high voter turnout spoke to the elections’ ultimate credibility, despite following a 
summer that had been fraught with conflict over its legitimacy.25 Largely peaceful, with only a few 
exceptions, it seemed as if Tunisia was to become a model of democratic transition for the rest of 
the region.  
 
As had been expected, Ennahda won eighty-nine of the 217 seats in the Constituent Assembly, far 
outpacing the next runners-up, left-wing parties Congrès pour la République (CPR), which won 
twenty-nine seats, and Ettakatol, which won twenty. Ennahda, CPR, and Ettakatol went on to form 
a governing coalition, popularly known as the Troika. Al-Aarridha al-Chaabia (Popular Petition) 
won twenty-six seats. This was surprising as its founder lived in London, and it had formed mere 
                                                  
17
 Goulding (2011a), p.2. 
18
 D. Pickard, ‘Challenges to legitimate governance in post-revolution Tunisia’, The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 
26(4), p.641. 
19
 From the ISIE website: www.isie.tn. 
20
 S. Zouari, ‘Ad Campaign Urges Tunisian Women to Vote’, Tunisia Live, 27 September 2011. 
21
 B. Whitaker, ‘Tunisia is leading the way on women’s rights in the Middle East’, The Guardian, 10 September 2011. 
22
 Pickard (2011) p.645. 
23
 Popular spelling conventions have changed since the 1990s, al-Nahdah is now typically written as Ennahda, or 
Ennahdha. 
24
 Interview, 20 April 2012. 
25
 Pickard (2011), p.641. 
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months before the election, remaining relatively unknown,26 but was suspected to be affiliated to 
the RCD.27 The socialist Parti Démocrate Progressiste (PDP) won seventeen seats; the secular, anti-
Islamist coalition group Pole Démocratique Modernist (PDM) took five; and Afek Tounes, a new 
secular, business-oriented party took four. The remaining seats went to some other small 
parties.28 These results highlighted the fractured nature of the secular political movements in 
contrast to Ennahda’s power as a united bloc. 
 
As for the gender breakdown, there seems to be some confusion over exactly how many women 
were elected and are currently serving in the Constituent Assembly. By and large, the most 
common number for both is forty-nine, however, some cite fifty-nine, while others cite sixty. ISIE, 
for its part, does not list deputies by gender, merely by party. According to the personal research 
of a Tunisian United Nations Development Programme gender specialist, who both implemented 
the gender training for UNDP and monitored the election, it appears as if fifty-one women were 
elected in districts in Tunisia while eight were elected from overseas. Before subsequent 
reshuffling following appointments to the government, forty women from Ennahda were elected, 
thirty-six from districts inside Tunisia. By contrast, eleven to fifteen secular women were elected 
in-country, while four were elected abroad, depending on how one defines secular.29 Why were 
the numbers of secular women so low, both in general and in comparison to Nahdawi women? 
Certainly more than 5-6% of women in Tunisia identify as secular. 
 
 
3. Gender Parity Law: Origins and Implementation 
  
When the High Commission was considering instituting the gender parity law in the spring of 2011, 
some thought that it would hamstring Ennahda, given the prevailing perception of Islamist 
attitudes towards women’s role in society. However, according to one of the experts consulted on 
electoral law by the High Commission, it was secular parties that were the most opposed to the 
gender parity law. Ennahda, confident in the depth of its support in general, favoured gender 
parity from the beginning, along with UGTT, ATFD, and AFTURD. However, CPR and some of the 
other newer and smaller secular parties were initially against it. They, unlike Ennahda, did not feel 
that they had a base level of female membership from which to draw 50% of their candidates. In 
the end, however, all entities voted favourably. 30 
  
Following the passage of the law, parties went about filling half of the positions on their candidate 
lists with women. ISIE was tasked with scrutinizing each list and disqualifying those that did not 
meet the standards of the law, namely that the list was split evenly between genders and that the 
candidates were alternated by gender. Overall, women did fare moderately well, taking at least 
forty-nine of the 217 seats, about a quarter in total. While an impressive percentage given the 
global lack of female political representation, there was substantial disparity between the number 
of female candidates and the resulting number of female deputies. 
 
The reason for this disparity lies not so much in the implementation of the law as it was written, 
but rather in the space left for interpretation. The law specifies two conditions for compliance with 
the gender parity law: the number of women running relative to men and their alternation on the 
list. While women did indeed comprise 50% of the candidates, they only headed 8% of the lists. 
                                                  
26
 Parker, E., ‘Aridha Chaabia, ‘Popular Petition,’ Shocks Tunisian Politics (UPDATED)’, Tunisia Live, 27 October 2011. 
27
 Ghribi, A., ‘Hechmi Hamdi Elected as Head of Party of Progressive Conservatives’, Tunisia Live, 6 February 2012. 
28
 ‘Reflections on Women in the Arab Spring: Women’s Voices from Around the World’, K. Headman and M. Youssef 
(eds.), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2012. 
29
 Personal Interview, 19 April 2012. 
30
 Personal Interview, 23 April 2012. 
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Within the legal framework set out by the High Commission, the law does not define parity as 
requiring half of the lists to be headed by women. Only one party, PDM, interpreted parity as to 
include the gender of the candidate heading the list, while Afek Tounes came close. The structure 
of voting amplified the systematic male preference. Using a proportional list-based voting system 
places great emphasis on the order of the candidates on the list. The proportion of votes received 
per party determines how many candidates, starting from the top of the list, will become deputies. 
Due to the paucity of female-headed lists, the proportion of men elected far outpaced that of 
women.  
 
Although all female candidates were affected, secular women were decidedly more so, evidenced 
by the fact that Nahdawi women held almost all of the seats won by female candidates. The 
origins of this disparity lie in the success of Ennahda compared to any individual secular party. 
Although roughly 60% of the voting population did not vote for Ennahda, there was no 
comparable concentration of support for any one secular party. Most secular parties won no more 
than one seat per district, meaning that only the head of the list, comprised of mostly men, were 
actually elected, regardless of the total percentage of female candidates. The heads of Ennahda’s 
lists were similarly male dominated. However, the relative popularity of Ennahda in comparison to 
individual secular parties ensured that more than just the candidate at the head of the list was 
elected. This resulted in the election of a higher number of female Nahdawi deputies in 
comparison to secular ones, despite similarly narrow definitions of parity. 
 
 
4. Women and Political Parties 
  
The order of the candidates on the list and the voting structure explain the disparity between 
female candidates and female deputies, but not the reasons behind the systematic preference for 
male candidates over female candidates for the lead positions on the lists.  
 
Immediately after Ben Ali fell, the issue of women’s rights came to the fore of public discourse. 
With the surprisingly meteoric rise of Ennahda, secular women became immediately fearful of 
losing the rights that they had already gained. As the election approached, women’s rights came 
to be situated in a confrontational narrative between Islamists and secularists. Ennahda was 
accused of engaging in “double discourse”, essentially paying lip-service to progressivism publically 
while saving conservative rhetoric for more radical elements. Their emphasis on differentiation 
between secularists and Islamists overshadowed how the secular parties were incorporating 
women into the newly opened political arena. The fact that almost no secular party promoted 
parity between heads of lists had been surprising, especially given the supportive rhetoric of 
secular party leaders in addition to the historic appearance of secular women’s visible role in 
society. The president of a new election monitoring organization, described how, “All the Tunisian 
people expected a lot of women to be on the top of the lists, but they weren’t. We expected that 
but then we saw the opposite”.31  
 
In exploring the reasons behind the dearth of female headed lists, four reasons arose: (i) 
mentalité; (ii) marginalization from central party structures; (iii) lack of female party members or 
lack of interest in candidacy; (iv) lack of qualified women. 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
31
 Personal Interview, 18 April 2012. 
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 (i) Mentalité 
  
Mentalité, essentially constructed patriarchal attitudes that situate women as inferior to men, 
mediated the full and equal incorporation into secular political parties. A publicly unreleased 
seminar debriefing by the UNDP, reveals evidence of misogyny within the ranks of the political 
parties which impacted how women were seen and utilized within them. From a series of focus 
groups with nineteen female candidates, representing fifteen political parties, it describes how 
even the parties that purported to be the most progressive and modernist: 
 
 …still believe that women are incapable of providing political leadership. The parties, through 
their management, continue to devalue women and perpetuate stereotypes. There is not, 
fundamentally, a real conviction of the need to involve women and the role that they could 
provide. Political parties remain ‘private clubs for men’.32  
 
The report went on to demonstrate how this attitude made the political party leadership unwilling 
to “bet on women candidates” i.e. by putting them first on the list of candidates.33  
  
 (ii) Marginalization from central party structure 
  
This mentalité of male superiority manifested tangibly within party leadership. Referring to the 
male dominance of internal party structures, one candidate from PDP described how women were 
kept out of the inner decision-making circles. She considered that “They were very happy to have 
me and gave me lots of things to do. But I found that women, they don’t have any power to decide 
anything in the political party. Men have all the power”.34 This account is supported by the UNDP 
debriefing. It described how the process of constructing the list put women at a disadvantage 
because of the insularity of the decision-making bodies. Although newer parties tended to have a 
more open and inclusive process for creating the lists, older political parties’ processes were less 
so. They tended to use their male-dominated political bureaus for this purpose, using unspecific 
and unclear selection criteria. The women in the focus group also cited the fact that there were no 
provisions in the party by-laws that obligated representation of women in political decision-
making positions.35  
  
 (iii) Lack of female party members or interest in candidacy 
  
Many cited the lack of female party members in general and, linked to this, a lack of interest by 
women in becoming candidates. The reasons behind this reveal a range of gendered social 
pressures including the social inappropriateness of women in politics and the inhospitality of the 
political arena to women, along with the relative difficulty women have balancing politics with 
their other responsibilities. A candidate from PDM, the coalition that did achieve parity between 
heads of lists, describes the unique difficulties facing women who want to go into politics,  
 
 Women have much more responsibilities [sic]. They have families and take care of their kids. If 
they work, they still have to take care of their families. I see many women activists in political 
parties right now…It is a challenge that women have to face. Women have to make the choice 
to give much more time to political activity. But it is easier for them [men]. Women can’t get 
                                                  
32
 UNDP, ‘Le parcours des candidates aux élections de l’Assemblée Nationale Constituante: Compte, rendu, Leçons 
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rid of their family responsibilities. Men can lean on their wives much more than a wife can lean 
on her husband for taking care of the kids and taking care of meals.36  
 
Women who do make the choice to go into politics have to then deal with societal judgments or 
her own guilt at choosing politics over her family. A Nahdawi deputy who holds a prominent 
position on the Commission for Human Rights in the Assembly, describes these feelings: 
 
 During the campaign, there are some men that get back to their house at 2, 3, or 4 in the 
morning. They don’t feel guilty about not taking care of their kids. But if I get home late, and I 
did when I was doing a lot of work doing door-to-doors, I felt guilty for not taking care of my 
kids. Even if my husband is taking care of my kids for me and doing a good job, I feel guilty.37  
 
These issues originate in patriarchal social structures that gender domestic and political 
responsibilities, placing obstacles unique to women that block pathways to accessing their full 
citizenship rights. Her experience highlights the fact that these gendered pressures face both 
secular and Islamist women. 
  
 (iv) Lack of qualified female candidates 
  
Both men and women attributed the lack of female-headed lists to the fact that there were not 
enough qualified women to run for office. Many described how after the gender parity law was 
passed, all parties were scrambling to fill their gender quotas so as not to have their lists 
disqualified. A female member of the Ettajdid political bureau and law professor describes, “A lot 
of parties, even Ennahda, were obliged to take women to put on the lists without looking for 
qualifications or even confidence”.38 This was levied as a criticism of all parties, because in 
choosing unqualified women, “it shows the population that women were not able to speak, 
govern, and participate well”.39 The perception that the recruited female candidates were 
underqualified creates a strong disincentive for the party leadership to put women at the head of 
the list.  
 
These criticisms were often invoked as a way to malign the credentials of the current Nahdawi 
female deputies by secularists, suggesting political, as well as gendered, motivations. These 
findings were reinforced by focus group research published by the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI). Its report details how the general perception was that women were included on the lists 
purely to satisfy gender quotas, and no way because of their qualifications.40 These comments 
were also made disparagingly, suggesting an attitude of derision towards women who engage 
politically. 
  
However, competence only came up in relation to female deputies. With the exception of the 
handful of political parties that had been allowed to operate under the Ben Ali regime, the vast 
majority of political parties and their members were new to politics. Citing only the scarcity of 
competent women as a way to explain the lack of comprehensive parity seemed to gender the 
competence issue. The expert consulted by the Revolutionary Council on parity summed up her 
thoughts on this: 
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 In our country, we have had many, many deputies, men, who are not competent. So now why 
are we talking about competence now that we are dealing with women? We have never had 
competent deputies! They did not have great capacities! So now that we are talking about 
women, we are talking about competence!41 
 
When asked her thoughts on this, a young female blogger who was active in the uprisings 
exclaimed indignantly, “There aren’t enough competent men for the Constituent Assembly! 
Politics is new for all of us”.42 Rather than indicating an actual disparity in competence, this 
attitude could be reflective of deeper perceptions about the political value of women in general, in 
other words, the mentalité that determines the incorporation of women into secular politics. 
 
 
5. The Electorate: Perceptions of Women 
 
Female candidates were not only battling misogyny from within their own party ranks. The 
mentalité evident in the structural exclusion of women and in the parties’ attitudes towards its 
female members is reflective of wider societal views on the appropriate role for women in society. 
By a wide margin, the most frequently cited reason for the existence of barriers to equal female 
political participation in general, was “culture” or “mentalité” related to the appropriateness of 
women in politics.  
 
The communications director for ATFD and an active participant in the uprisings, pointed out that, 
“There are a lot of voices that…say the natural place is in the house for women”.43 The campaign 
director for Afek Tounes, described it in cultural terms, “It is a cultural problem in Tunisia. I deal 
with people who see women at a different level than men, who don’t see women as smart as men. 
Even some women feel that too!”44 The law professor from Ettajdid, also framed this issue 
culturally: 
 
 The image of women that we have in our society is that women are unable to govern. There is 
the famous phrase in the Muslim world that says, ‘There is no goodness in the nation governed 
by women’. This phrase is still around. So it is really difficult to show that a woman is able to 
enter into the political sphere to have opinions and not to be still at home taking care of 
children and so on”.45  
 
An official at the US Embassy summed it up, “Tunisia is an inherently conservative society. It isn’t 
America with an Arab veneer”.46 These descriptions are supported through observations derived 
from NDI’s research. It found that: 
 
 [G]ender norms are deeply embedded in participants’ environments, illustrated by 
respondents’ comfort placing women and men in traditional gender roles in both private 
spheres (family, household) and public (political institutions, workplace). Participants 
expressed a widespread and traditional mentality that women should play a mostly private 
role in Tunisian society.47 
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6. Secular Women and Campaigns 
 
This mentalité regarding the suitable role for Tunisian women in society underpins the patriarchal 
structures that shape the political field unevenly between male and female candidates. The 
prevailing attitudes about women’s suitability in public and political life create a vast series of 
challenges for women seeking to transcend that social barrier.  
 
Battling stereotypes of female inferiority, women must work harder to prove their worth as 
political candidates. My informants reiterated this point repeatedly across party lines. The 
Nahdawi deputy saw this in her campaign and, subsequently, in the Assembly, “The challenge for 
women is always having to prove herself more to get to higher levels of government”.48 The 
communications director for ATFD stated that it was the biggest challenge facing a woman in 
politics: proving herself deserving of candidacy.49 From the outset, women faced a gendered 
challenge in the pathway to legitimacy. This challenge was compounded by the media’s failure to 
cover women’s campaigns to the same degree as those of men.50 This underrepresentation of 
women in the media created yet another barrier to overcoming damaging stereotypes and was 
reflective of the societal devaluation of female political potential.  
 
This entrenchment of social mores that locate women in the private sphere makes it harder for 
female candidates to access some public spaces to campaign. For instance, Tunisia, like many 
states in the region, has a thriving male-dominated café culture. In Tunisia, male-only spaces in the 
capital decreased under Ben Ali, as a reinforcement of Tunisia’s modernity. Outside the capital, 
men have continuously dominated café culture, insofar that it is inappropriate for women to 
venture inside. Even in Tunis, since the fall of Ben Ali, public spaces have become more gender 
segregated, including the re-segregation of cafés. But cafés serve a larger role in Tunisian culture 
and in the region. More than just places to buy and consume coffee, cafés are hubs of political and 
social activity, and thus vital spaces to access for candidates during campaign season. Given the 
gendered nature of these spaces, however, some female candidates had a hard time transcending 
the social rules that exclude them. Not all female candidates reported difficulty accessing male-
only spaces like cafés,51 but many informants spoke of instances in the rural areas in which women 
were not allowed to participate in a political debate because of its location in a traditionally male 
space. Transcending these engrained social rules can be very difficult for female candidates 
especially when there is no guarantee that their presence will be received positively. 
 
Verbal, online, and even physical harassment was a huge problem for many female candidates 
during the campaign, even in places that are not designated male spaces, real or virtual. Although 
both men and women faced difficulties during the campaign, women faced some uniquely 
gendered ones. Whereas men often received questions about their platforms and ideas, women 
were judged, challenged, and often harassed about their personal appearance, their morality, 
their marital status, and personal life.  
 
The experiences of Bochra Belhaj Hamida, the former president of ATFD and current lawyer-cum-
activist, are often cited as a prime example of the type of harassment that specifically secular 
women face, much of which is sexualized. Bochra lives in Tunis, but ran in Zaghouan, a 
conservative city outside the capital. She does not use her husband’s last name and was aggressed 
on her Facebook page and at campaign events for supposedly being unmarried. There were 
rumours about her morality, and by extension her sexuality. There were also rumours about 
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pictures existing on her Facebook of her consuming alcohol.52 Although Bochra was at the head of 
the list, she was not elected. The vitriol directed at Bochra about her personal life is credited with 
Ettakatol’s loss in that district, in that their proportion was not even high enough to send their top 
candidate from the list to the Assembly.  
 
Bochra is a well-known public figure who takes vocal stands on controversial issues, such as equal 
inheritance, which could account for some of the ire directed at her. However, her campaign was 
not an isolated incident. One candidate from PDP describes the defamation of a poster put up by 
the campaign for a colleague. The eyes of the woman’s face had been scratched out and someone 
had scrawled across the bottom, “Do not vote for this slut and lesbian”. She also reports that she 
was often aggressed by men with beards, usually associated with salafism in Tunisia, for not being 
religious or moral enough. She says her colleagues faced similar challenges, especially in the rural 
areas.53 Even Maya Jribi, the Secretary-General of the Constituent Assembly and arguably the best-
known female politician in Tunisia, faced verbal, sexualized harassment. Khedija Arfaoui, 
prominent feminist and human rights activist, suggested that it was intended to discourage 
women from entering the public sphere.54  
 
Secular women are the most vulnerable to these types of attacks on morality. Particularly in rural 
areas, secular women running for office represent a direct challenge to patriarchal social 
structures that locate women in the private sphere. They thus stand in direct contrast to the 
model of a “good woman”. Nahdawi women, all of whom wear the hijab except for one high-
profile case, are typically protected from these assertions by virtue of their visual commitment to 
their faith. Also compounding the vulnerability of secular women is their association with the 
former regime. The fact that Ben Ali championed secular women’s rights, often at the expense of 
Islamist women, does secular female candidates no favours in conservative areas. Some report 
being taunted with shouts along the lines of, “Ben Ali was your father! What will you do without 
your father to protect you?”55 In their research, NDI also notes a negative association between the 
ancien regime and the “modern” woman.56 This confluence of social forces creates a unique set of 
challenges for secular female candidates in the field. 
 
 
7. The Gendered Impact of Campaign Finance 
  
The structure of campaign finance was the final factor contributing to the unique challenges facing 
secular female candidates. Ennahda was the financial front-runner throughout the entire 
campaign season. Ennahda’s wealth, in conjunction with its leadership’s political acuity, was 
apparent in the sophistication and organization of their operation. By contrast, the secular parties, 
with the exception of CPR, were vastly underfunded. Their relative poverty, along with the 
nascence of many of the secular parties, was also evident in their lack of organization or 
sophistication. This lack of resources meant that, in secular parties, support was spread thinly 
amongst the different candidates. Although all candidates within a party suffered from lack of 
resources, this situation resulted, nonetheless, in gendered outcomes when interacting with the 
patriarchal social structures already in place within Tunisia. 
 
Lack of party resources meant that secular parties were often unable to embed their candidates 
within a party structure when they were campaigning in more remote areas. While men could 
                                                  
52
 Personal Interviews, April 2012 
53
 Personal Interview, 25 April 2012. 
54
 Personal Interview, Khedija Arfaoui, 18 April 2012. 
55
 Personal Interview, 16 April 2012. 
56
 Yahia and Borovsky. 
University of Cambridge · Centre of Governance and Human Rights · Working Paper 3  
Petkanas, Z., ‘From Visible to Invisible’, March 2013  15 
benefit from party support during campaign events, women were, in many instances, hampered 
by its lack. Most prevalent in remote areas, the gendered division of space and the prevailing 
attitudes about women in politics presented challenges in and of themselves. Being embedded 
within the (mostly male) party structure in remote areas could have given female candidates the 
tools to overcome structural, patriarchal challenges.  
 
However, due to the state of secular parties’ finances, in the areas where the need was more 
acute, women were less equipped to deal with the challenges that arose from patriarchal social 
structures, such as lack of access to all public spaces. Every secular female candidate that I 
interviewed highlighted the vulnerability of women campaigning alone in rural areas. As a current 
deputy from Afek Tounes described it, 
 
 As a woman, the terrain was very difficult. You have to know that you are a woman and that 
you will face difficulties. Sometimes you really need a man with you. I felt like I needed a man 
with me when I was in the rural parts”.57  
 
By contrast, a UNDP representative testified to the fact that Nahdawi female candidates were 
accompanied by high-level party representation at every campaign stop. She says, “They really 
gave the impression that they were a team with these women. This never happened with the 
other parties. Never”.58 Despite the fact that being embedded in the male party apparatus proved 
a political advantage, it also underscored the patriarchal norms that inform the roles that are 
deemed appropriate for women. 
 
The difficulties of secular female candidates were compounded by the party’s internal structuring 
of campaign finance. The way some of the secular parties distributed their limited resources also 
had an unintended gendered impact. By nature of the proportional list voting, the candidate in the 
top position on the list received the most party support during the campaign. As male candidates 
occupied most of these positions, women systematically had less access to party resources before 
the elections. Compounding this, the candidate at the top of the list was often tasked with 
allocating party finances to the other candidates. With male candidates both heading up almost 
every list and dominating internal party power structures, campaign finances were controlled 
almost exclusively by men. Even women who occupied the second slot on party lists reported 
having more difficulty accessing adequate funds for their campaigns than their male compatriots, 
indicating that the mentalité of male superiority underpinned distribution of funds.59 This meant 
that secular female candidates were disadvantaged relative to their fellow male candidates as well 
as in comparison to Nahdawi female candidates. Here, the implications of patriarchal attitudes 
informing the construction of male-dominated lists played out through a structurally gender-
neutral policy of internal financial allocation.  
 
 
8. Consequences of Exclusion 
  
With the constitutional process ongoing, the impact on policy by the underrepresentation of 
secular women in the Constituent Assembly remains to be seen. Although the future effects of 
secular women’s exclusion remain unclear, the political implications of their current invisibility in 
formal politics are already playing out. 
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“Women in Tunisia are afraid,” declared the vice president of a new organization focused on 
encouraging female political participation.60  Among women in the established women’s 
movement,61 the discourse on the challenges facing secular women is united to the point of being 
hegemonic. The dominant themes centre on fear of Ennahda eroding rights that women have 
already acquired, given the high degree of formal rights that they have historically enjoyed. Due to 
this fear, Ennahda, its influence in the Constituent Assembly, and Islamism more broadly is 
invariably positioned as the greatest challenge currently facing secular Tunisian women. This 
threat requires “vigilance”, another hegemonic concept in secular feminist discourse. This dynamic 
places secular women in total opposition to Ennahda, viewed, as it were, as an essentially 
existential threat to women’s rights.  The vigilance that characterizes this fear creates a frame 
through which secular women view Ennahda’s moves. Every action that seems to confirm secular 
women’s fears is woven into a narrative that strengthens the already existing aura of distrust, in a 
mutually reinforcing cycle.  
 
Since its re-emergence last year, Ennahda’s official rhetoric has been progressive and moderate. 
Despite these and other assurances, rumours of “double” discourse, wherein the public image of 
Ennahda is progressive while privately, and in front of more conservative elements, is radical. 
Instances of high-profile Nahdawi politicians making comments that seem to indicate an 
underlying conservatism have only served to reinforce that perception.62 When the first draft of 
the constitution was published in August of 2012, the use of “complementary”, rather than 
“equal” in the first draft of the constitution released in August when describing the nature of the 
relationship between men and women, further strengthened these perceptions.63 
 
The antagonism felt between secular women and Ennahda is situated within a larger context of 
antipathy between secularists in Tunisia and the Islamist movement. The discourse of secularists in 
the political arena in general has some similarities with the secular women’s discourse, in that 
there is palpable fear and uncertainty surrounding the intensions of Ennahda. This fear is focused 
on the general direction that Ennahda is taking the country, rather than specific regression on 
women’s rights. This fear, however, must be appraised from within a political context in which the 
opposition’s power is severely limited. For the secularists in opposition, the political arena is 
meaningfully divided between Islamists and secularists than in any other way. The murky 
relationship between Ennahda and more radical salafist groups has only served to fuel this divide. 
Ennahda was accused of inadequately providing safety and security when salafist elements 
attacked the American Embassy and an American school.64 The result has been an inflammation of 
political tensions and clashes between pro- and anti-government forces.   
 
The result of this complex web of relations between Ennahda, secular women, and secularists in 
general is a mutually reinforcing cycle of distrust, fracture, and paralysis, negatively impacting the 
process of democratic transition. The fear that secular women feel concerning Ennahda’s true 
political orientation is very real indeed, both reinforced by and informing the construction of a 
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unified narrative of Ennahda’s hidden extremism. This tension is exacerbated by Ennahda’s failure 
to act, either affirming or contradicting secular women’s worst fears in a tangible way. This further 
heightens the aura of distrust that already exists between them. This, in turn, further positions 
secular women in oppositional roles to the government, intensifying the fractured nature of the 
political arena.  
 
This dynamic is grounded within and mirrors a confrontationalist relationship between the Islamist 
and secular movements more broadly, albeit for different reasons. Ennahda’s lack of movement 
on women’s rights, while potentially ideologically driven, is more likely reflective of the political 
paralysis that characterizes the entire political system. The Troika, with Ennahda as its indisputable 
leader, has been trying to prove its competence as the governing body, rather than as an 
oppositional force. This is a task made more difficult by the fear felt by secularists in general, due 
in no small part to their inability to sufficiently mobilize. This taints the relationship with yet more 
distrust, causing further polarization and entrenchment. Similar to the dynamic between women 
and Ennahda, this contributes further to the political fracturing and subsequent paralysis on 
important issues.  
 
The nature of this unfortunate cycle is mutually reinforcing, becoming ever more intractable and 
entrenched. Meanwhile, the catalysts of the uprisings and the future of Tunisia, the youth, are 
increasingly alienated from the political arena, whilst the dire economic problems facing the 
majority of Tunisians go unaddressed. As the debate over the constitutional draft continues the 
consequences of this dynamic will become ever more clear.  
 
 
9. Conclusions 
  
The High Commission, in passing the gender parity law, recognized the potential for differentiated 
access to formal political power along gendered lines, essentially ackowledging the patriarchal 
nature of Tunisian state and society that mediates women’s full access to their citizenship rights. 
But in the aftermath of the elections, it was clear that access to political power was not solely 
differentiated by gender, as secular women faced unique challenges by virtue of their identity. 
Some of these challenges were gendered outcomes of nominally gender-neutral political 
processes as a result of the natures of the secular political movements as contrasted with the 
Islamist movement, Ennahda. Many, however, were anchored in deeply engrained social and 
cultural mores regarding the value of women and the nature of their role in Tunisian society, 
revealing a different set of popularly held values than the ones supposedly mirrored in the former 
hegemonic image of the Tunisian woman. Clearly the former image of the Tunisian woman clashed 
with the product of a cultural, rather than a political, process of subjectification. This dynamic 
highlights the artificialness of that former image of secular women as autonomous political agents, 
as perceived advantages accrued under the former regime evaporated once the protection of the 
state bounds fell away. 
 
Access to political power, was indeed thereby differentiated. Still unclear, however, is the true 
nature of that differentiation. Is it a cross-section of both gender and secularism? Or is it merely 
gendered? The differentiation of access existed at the intersection of gender and secularism in 
2011. However, it is yet uncertain whether the challenges facing secular women would have been 
universal without the political advantages that Nahdawi women had access too, mitigating the 
effects of gendered challenges. 
 
Regardless of the true nature of the differentiation, the contemporary discourse positions secular 
women in opposition to Islamist women, exacerbated by the respective (in)visibility in formal 
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politics. This antagonism has larger political implications for the nature of the Tunisian polity, 
embedded as it is within a larger narrative of confrontation between secularism and Islamism. 
Fostering mutual distrust between Islamists and secularists, this narrative is both informed by and 
perpetuates a general political paralysis. This cyclically reinforcing antagonism is reflected in the 
situation now faced by Tunisian feminists. This process serves merely to deepen the divisions 
between the two entities of Islamism and secularism, the gendered manifestations of which have 
come to represent divergent, and apparently dichotomous, visions for the new Tunisian polity. 
While the ultimate political implications of this process have yet to play out, the wider political 
elite fights for the ideological soul of the state, as the rest of the Tunisian people must wait for the 
benefits of their revolution to emerge.  
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